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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
MERRILL HOLBROOK, ) 
Defendant and Appellant} . 
) 
vs. Case No. 7296 
LOUISE HOLBROOK, 
Plaintiff and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On the 3rd day of May, 1948 the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Davis County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley presiding, granted a divorce to the respond-
ent herein against the appellant, and, among other things, 
ordered the appellant to pay to the respondent the sum of 
$150.00 per month for the support and maintenance of four 
minor children, the issue of the marriage between the two, 
the custody of which children was, by the decree, awarded 
to the respondent. 
On the 11th day of January, 1949 the appellant herein 
was cited before the court for failure to pay the full amount 
of said support money. At said hearing on January 11, 1949 
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Judge A. H. Ellett, temporarily sitting in the Second Judical 
District presided. The evidence indicated that from the time 
of the entry of the decree in May of 1948 until the 11th day 
of January, 1949 the appellant herein had paid to the respond-
ent the sum of approximately $630.00. The court ordered the 
appellant committed to the county jail for a period of thirty 
days for contempt unless the appellant paid to the respondent 
the support money found in arrears in the sum of $645.00. 
At the time of the hearing on January 11, 1949 a petition 
was filed by the appellant herein for the reduction of the 
support money for the children from $150.00 per month to 
$80.00 per month on the ground that changed financial con-
ditions on the part of the respondent occurring between the 
date of the entry of the decree in May of 1948 and the date 
of the filing of the petition made such reduction equitable. 
The court declined to hear evidence on this point on the ground 
that changed conditions in financial circumstances in the mother 
was not such a changed condition that would under any cir-
cumstances warrant a change in the amount of support money 
payable. 
This appeal is taken from the order of the court holding 
the appellant herein in contempt of court and also from the 
refusal of the court to consider the appellant's petition for 
a modification of the decree. The facts as brought out at the 
hearing will be more fully discussed in relation to the points 
to which they are applicable. 
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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The appellant assigns the following errors as a basis for 
asking this court for a reversal of the holding of the lower 
court: 
1. The court erred in its finding that the appellant herein 
had received $435.00 per month during the period between 
the entry of the divorce decree and the hearing on the contempt 
procedings. 
2. The court erred in holding the appellant herein in 
contempt for failure t::> pay the sum of $645.00 in the absence 
of a finding on the part of the court that the appellant was able 
to pay such amount. 
3. The court erred in holding that changed financial 
cimcumstances on the part of a mother are not such changed 
circumstances as may justify the modification of an order 
for the payment of suport money for minor children. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING AS TO THE 
APPELLANT'S EARNINGS. 
On page 51 of the record the court stated: "It appears 
you received four hundred thirty-five dollars a month less the 
expense on the house * * * " This statement is in direct 
variance with the evidence presented at the hearing. It was 
stipulated between the parties that the appellant herein earned 
the sum of $300.00 per month. (Tr. 14). The court evi-
dently based its statement that the defendant received $435.00 
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per month on the fact that the evidence shows that the home, 
which had formerly belonged to the parties hereto, was being 
rented for the sum of $135.00 per month. This statement, 
however, overlooks entirely the fact which appears in the 
evidence (Tr. 43) that both of the parties hereto conveyed 
this home to the appellant's mother and that she in turn 
borrowed $7500.00 on this home and turned it over to the 
appellant in order that he might pay to the respondent the 
cash settlement ordered at the time the divorce decree was 
entered in May, 1948. The evidence shows that this home 
still belongs to the appellant's mother and that while the 
rent payments were made on said home at the appellant's 
place of business he received none of it. The appellant 
specifically testified that he had received no money whatsoever 
from the rental of this house. The respondent introduced 
no evidence whatever to contradict this statement. The finding 
of the court, therefore, that the appellant received the sum 
of $435.00 is not only not supported by the evidence but is 
in direct contradiction to the evidence in the record on this 
point. 
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE APPELLANT 
COMMITTED FOR CONTEMPT IN THE ABSENCE 
OF A FINDING AS TO HIS ABILITY TO PAY. 
There were no formal findings at all entered following 
the hearing of January 11, 1949. There is in the record on 
page 123 a minute entry signed by the court wherein the court 
states: "That the defendant was able to have paid the sums 
assessed against him according to the decree and that he wilfully 
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neglected and failed to pay the sum of $645.00 of the sum 
of assessed." Whether or not this minute entry can be con-
sidered as a formal finding counsel has strong doubts. It has been 
held by this court in a number of cases that an order of con-
tempt cannot be sustained in the absence of findings. 
Assuming, however, that the findings as entered are 
proper as to form they are not sufficient to support the con-
tempt order of the court. There is no finding, and if there 
were such a finding there is no evidence to support it, that the 
defendant at the time of the hearing on January 11, 1949 had 
the ability to pay the $645.00 that he was ordered to pay. 
The defendant specifically denied that he had the ability to 
pay this amount at the time and no proof was entered by 
respondent that he was able to do so. 
Contempt generally falls into two classes, punitive and 
purposive contempt. Punitive contempt is designed to punish 
a person for some act or omission which constitutes contempt 
of the court's order. Purposive contempt on the other hand 
is designed to compel the individual to comply with an order 
of the court. This is clearly a purposive contempt. The court 
ordered the appellant committed to jail unless he made pay-
ment of the sum of $645.00. If the contempt had been punitive 
he would have been ordered to jail regardless of his payment 
or if payment had been ordered it would have been a payment 
in the nature of a fine made to the state and not a payment to 
the other party in the case. Where a contemp~ is purposive 
it is clear that the person ordered to comply with the directive 
of th~ court must be presently able to comply. This matter 
is discussed at length by the Supreme Court of the State of 
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Washington in the case of Snook v. Snook, 188 Pac. 502. 
There the court stated: 
"This is not a criminal contempt proceeding. It is a 
civil contempt proceding, the object of which is not 
to punish the appellant, but to coerce him to pay the 
money in satisfaction of the alimony portion of the 
decree of divorce. 6 R. C. L. 490. It may be that 
appellant's past failure to make the payments is of such 
inexcusable character that he could be punished by 
fine or imprisonment in a criminal contempt proceeding, 
regardless of his present inability to make payment 
thereof; but, if so, such punishment would have to be 
in the nature of a fine of a fixed amount payable to the 
state, or to be satisfied by imprisonment at the rate 
of a fixed sum for each day of imprisonment, or such 
punishment would have to be imprisonment for a 
fixed term. Such is not the nature of the judgment 
sought or rendered in this proceeding. In a contempt 
proceeding of this character, the object of which is to 
coerce the payment of money, the lack of ability to 
pay on the part of the defendant is always a complete 
defense against enforcing payment from the defendant 
by imprisonment. In harmony with the law on that 
subject in most of the jurisdictions of this country, 
this court has repeatedly so held. Holcomb vs. Hol-
comb, 53 Wash. 611, 102 Pac. 653; Bayle v. Boyle, 
74 Wash. 529, 133 Pac. 1009; Crombie v. Crombie, 
88 Wash. 520, 153 Pac. 306; Smiley v. Smiley, 99 
Wash. 577, 169 Pac. 962; Wells v. Wells, 99 Wash. 
492, L.R.A. 1918C, 291, 169 Pac. 970. 
We conclude that appellant's inability to pay the 
money as directed by the judgment from which he 
has appealed sufficiently appears to call for a reversal 
of the judgment. It is so ordered." 
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The Utah case of Watson z·. lVdtson, 72 Ut. 218; 269 
Pac. 775 appears to be directly in point, the only distinction 
between the two cases being that in \'\'atson v. Watson the 
defendant was ordered committed until he made payment of 
a certain amount where in this case the defendant is ordered 
committed for a definite term unless he makes such payment. 
The finding of the court in Watson v. \'7 atson as iri this case, 
if we are to consider the minute entry as a finding, ',vas to 
the effect that the defendant had earned sufficient money to 
pay the installments at the time they were due. Neither in 
the Watson case or in this case, however, was there any findin~ 
of a present ability on the part of the defendant to make 
payment. The language of the court in the Watson case was 
as follows: 
"The order comm1ttmg the defendant to imprison-
ment until he pays $600 delinquent alimony is assailed 
upon the ground that there is no sufficient proof or 
finding that the defendant had the ability to make 
the payment in default of which he was to be im-
prisoned. The finding of the court on this subject 
was that since the entry of the decree awarding alimony 
'defendant has earned sufficient wages to pay said 
alimony, but that defendant has willfully refused to 
pay said alimony, and this court finds that said de-
fendant is in contempt of court for willfully refusing 
to pay said alimony.' There was satisfactory and 
sufficient evidence to support the above finding. 
( 1) The particular question here, however, arises 
upon the contention of defendant that the finding made 
by the court does not warrant or support the judgment 
of imprisonment which was entered against him. It 
is argued that a finding of present ability to comply 
with an order is an essential prerequisite to an order 
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that the delinquent be imprisoned until he does comply. 
In support thereof the following cases are cited: Ex 
parte Silvia, 123 Cal. 293, 55 P. 988, 69 Am. St. Rep. 
58; In re Cowden, 139 Cal. 244, 83 P. 156; Lutz v. 
District Court, 29 Nev. 152, 86 P. 445; Ex parte Ham-
berg, 37 Idaho, 550, 217 P. 264-to which may be 
added our own decision in Hillyard v. District Court 
(Utah) 249 P. 806. 
The judgments considered in the cited cases were 
all coercive in form and purpose and intended to 
compel the payment of money by the delinquent, by 
an order of indefinite imprisonment until the payment 
was made. To support such a judgment in contempt 
it is clear that it should first appear that the act sought 
to be coerced was yet within the power of the per:;on 
proceeded against to perform. It would be repugnant 
to reason and futile to order a person imprisoned 
until he did some particular thing, unless he had the 
present ability to do it." 
The court evidently hoped to avoid the effect of the Watson 
case by making the term of imprisonment for a definite term 
to be suspended upon the payment of $645.00 to the clerk of 
the court without stating that it was for the benefit of the 
respondent herein. However, the evidence clearly indicates 
and the court stated in its minute entry that the $645.00 was the 
amount unpaid on the alimony and therefore regardless of what 
the language of the court may have been it is obvious the effect 
of the order was that the appellant herein must pay the amount 
in arrears in alimony or be committed to jail. It is very clearly 
a purposive contempt and directly within the provisions of 
Watson v. Watson. 
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THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CH1\NGED 
FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE \'VIPE IS 
NOT SUCH A CHANGE IN CONDITIONS AS TO 
BE CONSIDERED IN A PETITION FOR ~fODIFI­
CATION OF THE DECREE. 
Prior to the hearing on January 11, 1949 the appellant 
herein filed a cross-petition praying that the support money 
payments be reduced from $150.00 per month to $80.00 per 
month. The change in circumstances as alleged in this pe-
tition were that since the entry of the divorce decree the 
respondent herein had secured employment and was earning 
approximately $175.00 per month. When the appellant 
attempted to introduce evidence regarding the change in 
financial circumstances of the wife the court refused to hear 
it stating in effect that no change in the financial circumstances 
of the wife resulting from her employment should be con-
sidered in a petition for reduction of support but that the 
only change in circumstances that could be considered was 
the change in the income of the husband (Tr. 52). Had 
the court considered the evidence as to the wife's earnings and 
then found that such change in circumstances was not sufficient 
to justify a modification of the decree, it may be that such 
a finding would have been within the discretion of the court. 
However, the court in this case found that a change in the 
financial circumstances of the wife resulting from her em-
ployment is not a matter that should be considered at all 
and the court refused to let counsel for the appellant pursue 
the matter (Tr. 23). 
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There is evidence in the record, however, which indi-
cates that the respondent herein was not employed and had 
no income at the time of the divorce decree. The evidence 
further indicates that at the time of the hearing she \vas 
and had for some months been employed at a salary of ap-
proximately $170.00 to $175.00 per month. Therefore, if 
the husband were to pay $150.00 per month out of his salary 
for the support of the wife and children, the wife, to maintain 
her household, would have a total income of approximately 
$320.00 as aginst $150.00 for the husband. When this is 
considered in connection with the fact that the husband 
turned over to the wife enough money to buy a home, which 
he had to borrow, and the further fact that the husband was 
obligated to pay in addition to this amount approximately 
$5000.00 (T. 41) in debts contractly jointly by himself and his 
wife prior to the time of the divorce it was certainly a situation 
that should have been considered by the court. 
Counsel is aware that the question of whether the em-
ployment of a wife folowing the entry of a divorce decree is 
such a change of circumstances as will warrant a modification 
of a decree an open question in this state. It is clear, as the 
court stated into the record (Tr. 23) that the re-marriage of 
the wife and the financial condition of the second husband 
have no bearing upon the amount the father must pay to 
support the children. However, a different circumstance 
exists where the wife has means of her own. In the case 
of Rockwood v. Rockwood, 236 Pac. 457, the court said in 
regard to the proof of the father: "He has not shown that 
the mother of the children is able to support them and even 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
if he had it is not clear that such fact would alter the case." 
As stated above the question as to whether or not the mother's 
ability acquired subsequently to the entry of the decree to 
support the children is such a change in circumstances as to 
warrant a modification is still an open question in this state. 
It appears to counsel, however, that a reading of our statute 
forces one to the conclusion that both the financial ability 
of the mother and the father should be taken into consideration 
in determining amounts payable by the father for the support 
of the children. Section 40-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
provides in part: 
" * * * Such subsequent changes or new orders 
may be made by the court with respect to the disposal 
of the children or the distribution of property as 
shall be reasonable and proper." 
In the case of Morris v. Morris, (Neb.) 290 N. W. 720 
the court stated: 
"The subsequent employment of plaintiff is a cir-
cumstance that may justify a modification of the decree 
as a matter of judicial discretion, if there are appealing 
equities in defendant's situation." 
In the case of Wassung v. Wasszmg (Neb.) 286 N. W. 
340 the court stated: 
"The reduction in defendant's wages and the em-
ployment of the plaintiff are changes in the circum-
stances of the parties that justify a prospective modifi-
cation of this decree under the power granted to the 
court in Section 42-312 Comp. St. 1929, and section 
42-324, Comp. St. Supp. 1937." 
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In each of the followitfg cases from varying jurisdictiom 
the employment of the wife subsequent to the entry of the 
divorce decree was considered as the sole factor or as a major 
factor in conjunction with other circumstances to justify a 
modification of the decree ordering payment of support money 
for minor children: Lines v. Lines, (S.D.)9 N. W. (2d) 705; 
Sullivan v. Sullivan (Neb.), 4 N. JJV. (2d) 919; Caprio v. 
Caprio (N. Y.) 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 205; Kat•anaugb v. Kctz·cm-
augb, (N. J.) 35 Atl. (2d) 691. 
As was stated above had the court considered the em-
ployment of the wife and then determined in its discretion 
that the facts still did not warrant a modification of the decree 
it may well be that such discretion would not be upset. How-
ever, in this case the appellant was not even allowed to go 
into that matter as the court held that as a matter of law 
such a change in circumstances was not such as could be con-
sidered as a basis for a modification. The order for the 
paym~nt of $150.00 per month support money for the children 
was reached in this case upon the basis of a stipulation. It 
was reached not because of the fact that the husband could 
afford to pay $150.00 out of his $300.00 earnings in view 
of the financial obligations which he had but because it was 
obvious that his wife having no other income could not support 
herself and the children on a lesser amount. However, when 
the wife secured employment a different situation existed. 
While it is true that the pressing situation in which the husbarid 
found himself has not been altered since the entry of the 
original divorce decree the overall financial picture of the 
husband, wife and the children has been considerably altered 
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to such an extent that some relief to the husband in view of 
the finacial burdens which he had to bear was obviously 
justified. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant urges that this matter should be returned 
to the district court with instructions to vacate the contempt 
order and with the direction to order a reduction in the amount 
of the support money payable by the husband in accordance 
with the prayer of the husband's petition. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON. 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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